An anyone who has been paying relatively close attention to Darfur knows, the situation seems to be growing more complex by the day. With the splintering of the rebel groups and the spill-over into Chad, it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep track of what is going on.
Fortunately, two excellent reports have been released this week that offer clear explanations of key developments in the region.
The first is the International Crisis Group's report
"Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement." This report is extremely informative, not only explaining the details of the peace agreement signed last month by Khartoum and a faction of the SLA, but also why the rebels are splintering and why some do not support the agreement.
The developments it covers are too interconnected to excerpt here, but I would like to excerpt one section that I thought was important
Meanwhile AMIS remains in dire need of reinforcement. Working with international partners, the AU should modify AMIS’s operational concept, specify the requirements for raising its efficiency and numbers and request generous donor assistance. Without immediate support, AMIS will fail even to begin its multiple DPA tasks and thus indirectly endanger the peace agreement.
To meet the challenge, AMIS has indicated that it needs five additional battalions within two months. The AU’s international partners have agreed to provide strategic transport, train AMIS commanders to take charge of the increased capabilities and troops and certify elements for absorption into a UN peacekeeping operation. Alarmingly, some experts have now begun to argue that the inability to agree quickly on implementation concepts may mean that the first of the five battalions cannot be deployed before October and the final one until February or March 2007. More energetic intra-AU and AU-donor cooperation is required to secure these much-needed reinforcements on an accelerated schedule.
The UN Secretary-General has worked hard to secure agreement for a donors conference to support implementation of this AMIS reinforcement plan, which is expected to take place in Brussels on 7 July. It is now up to the AU to present a convincing package proposal to secure funding from donors, some of whom may be reluctant to sponsor what is seen as a mission on its last legs. But without adequate AMIS support, the DPA is likely to unravel before the UN operation takes over in Darfur. That, in turn, would make the UN task more difficult, perhaps impossible. Additionally, of course, a larger, more effective AMIS could pave the way for a smoother transition to the UN by making a greater impact on the security and humanitarian situation in the interim.
In recent days, however, there has been increasing talk that the AU at its 1-2 July summit may extend the AMIS mandate to the end of the year. This parallels the suggestion heard more and more that it will be January or February 2007 at the earliest before a UN mission can be deployed. The surface plausibility of such an extension of the AMIS mandate, especially in view of the uncertainty regarding Khartoum’s position on a UN takeover, is more than counter-balanced by the certainty that it would have a chilling effect on the donor response to any AU funding proposal and on the preparations in New York necessary to take over responsibility from the AU in a timely fashion, where there is already a suggestion that at least six months will be needed to get a mission on the ground in Darfur once it has been authorized by the Security Council.
It is critical that the transition to a UN force in Darfur occur on or around 30 September 2006, when the AMIS mandate is presently due to expire. The longer the takeover is postponed, the less legitimate the DPA will become to many in Darfur, where there is already little confidence in it and in AMIS.
If you want to understand just what is going on in Darfur at the current time, this ICG report is a must-read.
Also this week, Human Rights Watch released "
Violence Beyond Borders: The Human Rights Crisis in Eastern Chad" which explains how the crisis in Darfur has spilled over into, and been exacerbated by, Chad's own internal problems.
The report explains how Chadian and Sudan rebels are being supported by the opposing governments and documents how, in recent months, Sudanese rebels have, with the aquiesence of the Chad government, begun forcibly recruting displaced civilians
At least 100 Sudanese rebels descended on Bredjing and Treguine camps on the afternoon of March 17; one of the first recruitment stops were schools, which were still in session. Hundreds of students were rounded up and taken away that first day, many of them minors. Over the course of the weekend of March 18 -19, the rebels rode roughshod over Bredjing and Treguine, plucking combat-capable men and boys from markets and conducting house-to-house and tent-to-tent searches in the camps, beating those who resisted and warning fearful family members not to get in their way.
Refugees recounted how men in military uniform (or partial uniform) armed with whips and clubs rounded them up in schools, markets and in their homes.
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Refugees were packed into pickup trucks and taken to a wadi outside the camps where men were waiting with firearms. Refugees recall with remarkable consistency a long walk to Arkoum, a Chadian town 20 kilometers southeast of Bredjing, where Sudanese rebels had set up a training camp.
Upon arrival at Arkoum, recruits were informed that they were now Sudanese rebels, their mission to liberate their country. They themselves were not free to leave, though; armed guards patrolled the perimeter of the camp day and night.
The report also documents how ethnic groups within Chad are splintering along ethnic lines in a manner that is directly related to the crisis in Darfur
Although the details are still poorly understood, preliminary investigation suggests that prior to October 2005, a broad spectrum of tribes in eastern Chad banded together in a self-defense network to resist Janjaweed incursions. Since October, however, it appears that some Chadian Arab groups became involved in Janjaweed atrocities in Chad. Testimony from the far east of Dar Sila, from villages such as Mongororo, three kilometers from Sudan, and Daguessa, ten kilometers from Sudan, hint at a reason why these new alliances are emerging. Village leaders report having been approached by Janjaweed “emissaries” late in 2005 with promises of immunity from attack in return for per capita payments in cash and cattle. These leaders claim that the “dues” would pay for membership in the wihida Arabia or “Arab Union,” with the condition that members must raid and pillage alongside the Janjaweed.
Numerous interviews in eastern Chad have made it apparent that non-Arab tribes including the Ouaddaï, Mimi and Tama have formed a kind of alliance, be it formal or informal, with Chadian and Sudanese Arab tribes. Just as Arabs are effectively immune to Janjaweed attacks, the Mimi, Ouaddaï and Tama, relatively recent arrivals in Dar Sila department, are said to be immune from such attacks as well. Non-Arab tribes such as the Dajo and Masalit, whose cousins have been Janjaweed targets in Sudan, accuse the Mimi, Ouaddaï and Tama of complicity in Janjaweed attacks, charging that they help Janjaweed locate concentrations of cattle belonging to the Dajo and Masalit for rustling.
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Chadian government efforts to shore up the border defenses by distributing arms to village self-defense groups may also be responsible for increased tensions among Chadian communities. Such distributions are said to have taken place in N’djamena and the eastern town of Guereda before and during the April 13 attacks, when Zaghawa citizens were armed by the government. The Chadian military has also reportedly armed and organized volunteers from villages south of Bahr Azoum, near the border with Central African Republic, an area of intensive Janjaweed activity.
As I noted earlier, both of these reports are extremely informative and, if you want to try and understand the increasingly complex crisis that is unfolding here, I highly recommend that you read these two reports.