The latest podcast from the
Committee on Conscience with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
JERRY FOWLER: What is it that you will do step-by-step? You present evidence to the judges and they have the power to issue arrest warrants?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: It is one possibility. The laws also say that I can request from Sudan a summons to appear before the Court to the individuals named, so it is not just another warrant. It is early to know what will be the outcome; the issue is that it is the beginning of the process. After we present the evidence, we identify the incidents and the individual has to be investigated in particular.
JERRY FOWLER: One technique that was used with actually great affect by the ad hoc tribunal for Yugoslavia was secret arrest warrants where arrest warrants were issued but it was kept secret and the individuals who were the subject of them did not know that they were subject to the warrant until they were apprehended. Do you have the ability to do that?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: Yes, in fact we did in Congo and Uganda, but maybe we are not doing this in this case because this case is a different case. It is early to mention, but probably we are not doing it this way.
JERRY FOWLER: I see. One question many people have when you talk about making out this case for the people who are most responsible is how far up the chain of command you think you will be able to go.
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: That is important in this case. I believe we can prove the system and we can show how these crimes were committed and how the system was organized, so that is why I think it is a very important case.
JERRY FOWLER: What are some of the challenges as a prosecutor to establishing the system, to establishing the structure that committed the crimes?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: The first challenge was that we had to investigate Darfur without going to Darfur. That was the most difficult part of our work in this case because in addition to this ongoing violence, there is an ongoing conflict, but this happened in Congo and Uganda, but even in Congo and Uganda, with limitation, we could go to the ground. In this case, basically the problem is that we cannot protect the witness in Darfur. When we interview a person, we have different steps. We have to first assess the security of the person; we have to assess if it is a victim if we can do some study to be sure not to re-traumatize this person. Then when we interview them, it is a protocol to explain what we are doing, record in different ways what the person is saying, and after that, we have to establish a system to protect the persons because we basically have to call this witness again, and the law says that we have to protect these peoples. We cannot do all of this in Darfur. From the beginning we decided how we could prove these crimes from outside. Then we developed a strategy, and basically we screened witnesses of the war. We screened more than 600 witnesses, and finally we took more like 100 statements; most of them eye-witnesses. In this way, we could reach the victims without going to Darfur. That was a huge challenge, but in addition, then the other issue was that the conflict in Darfur is very complicated—it has different faces, different actors—so it was very important not to discriminate the different groups that intervened in there. The laws say that we have to keep impartiality and we have to investigate incriminating circumstances, so what we did was we sent a request to the government of Sudan to interview some people, and finally in August, the government of Sudan authorized that and we could be in Khartoum interviewing two high officials from the civilian and military side who were involved in these facts and because of their positions, they could give us important information about what happened there. Basically, we could organize a very comprehensive investigation—of course what was very important, we received the information collected by the International Commission of Inquiry—but also, we received a report from the National Commission of Inquiry, and then we can check the information from many sources. Finally, I believe we have a very impartial investigation and a very thorough one.
JERRY FOWLER: These government officials that you interviewed in August, were they all the people that you requested to interview?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: No, we requested more, and we have outstanding requests, but we received two important interviews.
JERRY FOWLER: Do you think that you will the opportunity to go back and interview additional government officials, or have you basically moved on from that aspect of the investigation?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: Interestingly, in November, we sent a letter to the government saying that we are doing the final assessment on the case. That means that we want to check if they are doing a case against the same individual that we are investigating, and then the government sent to us a list of 14 new names that they are investigating, and our case is still admissible, but we request to the government of Sudan to interview these people, to understand what they do.
JERRY FOWLER: To interview the 14 people they say that they are investigating?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: Yes, so we are requesting to go in January to Khartoum to interview these people. The government in principle agreed, so we are planning this second part.
JERRY FOWLER: When you talk about admissibility, that is the principle that if a national government is conducting a good faith investigation, that then the ICC would stand back, right?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: Yes, we have to respect any genuine national proceedings. The first thing we had to check when we did the admissibility test is that if they are doing the same case, we have to check if it is a genuine case. That is the law.
JERRY FOWLER: When you say the same case, you are talking about involving the same individuals?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: Basically, the same individuals and the same behavior. It could be a slightly different incidence because there are many, but basically the same behavior, the same attributions. That is what we are trying to find. That is why we believe our case is still admissible.
JERRY FOWLER: I see. I don’t believe I asked you this before; about how many defendants do you anticipate being involved in this?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: No, we are not saying that; we present these names and numbers and evidence to the judges in February.
JERRY FOWLER: You refer to this as the first case in Darfur and it is dealing with the years 2003-2004. Do you anticipate that there will be additional cases?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: Yes, we always say that because the conflict is so complicated, we are planning to do a sequence of cases, and probably we are now discussing the second investigation while we are still in the middle of finishing the first one, but as soon as we are ready, we are planning to start the second investigation focusing on the current crimes, and we are worried because there is a spillover of violence. We now have cases in Chad that could be connected with our crimes. What we are planning to do is try to monitor all these new crimes, and interestingly, in this case we do not need a new referral from the Security Council because the Central African Republic is a state party, and in fact, they gave to us a referral like more than one year ago; and Chad is now, just joined the International Criminal Court system, so from January we can open a case in Chad because they are a state party. Now we can basically, in a combination of the referral from the Security Council and these states who are a member of the Court, we can do, as needed, a comprehensive investigation of the region. We are worried about these crimes across the borders.
JERRY FOWLER: In terms of your jurisdiction in Chad, does it only take affect in January or does it cover crimes that would have been committed before January?
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO: No, it would cover before also.
Labels: International Criminal Court